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Conclusion
"It is our opinion that the prompt and effective
implementation of these recommendations will
bring substantial improvement in the work of
stamping out gambling. Relentless war must be
carried on against organized crime. This war is a
continuing war. We can turn the tide only by
eternal vigilance and relentless prosecution of our
laws. Only by such measures can we strike a truly
devastating blow against gambling-the heartblood
of organized crime."'
IThe presentment was signed by Rudy Weiss-
bratten, Foreman, on behalf of "The Second Additional
Grand Jury of the County of Kings, for the March
1958 term." It was attested by Henrietta V. Carter,
Secretary. The presentment bears the date of February
26, 1959.
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Matthew J. Beemsterboer*
Remarks Made by Prosecutor in Closing
Argument, Though Ordinarily Improper, May Be
Proper in Response to Statements Made by
Defense-Defendant was convicted of second
degree murder. At the trial counsel for the defense
asserted that the testimony of the state's chief
witness, an admitted narcotics addict, had been
suborned by prosecuting officials. In his closing
argument the prosecutor stated that his reputa-
tion and that of the police were involved in the
trial. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed
the conviction, holding that although ordinarily
the prosecuting attorney may not attempt to
bolster the credibility of witnesses for the prosecu-
tion with the prestige of his office, the remarks he
made were proper in retaliation for the accusations
made by the defense. The defense, not the prosecu-
tion, interjected the reputation and character of
the prosecutor and police officials into the case.
People v. Marks, 160 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. 1959).
The trial judge refused to admit into evidence
a statement made by the victim alledgedly excul-
pating the defendant. The statement was made by
the decedent to a police officer, approximately six
minutes after the shooting, naming one Edward
Small as the person who had shot him. This state-
ment, though inadmissible as a dying declaration
because the decedent showed no awareness of im-
pending death, was sought to be introduced as a
spontaneous declaration. The trial judge ruled
that the declaration of the decedent lacked spon-
taneity and that "sufficient time had elapsed under
the circumstances so that it could have been a
reflective fabrication." The Court of Appeals found
no abuse of discretion in the resolution of this
preliminary question of fact.
Child Is Sixteen Years of Age or Under Only
on or Before Ris Sixteenth Birthday-Petitioner
*Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.
was charged with having committed lascivious
acts with a child sixteen years of age. He objected
to the jurisdiction of the court, contending that
the child involved was sixteen years, six months
and three days old at the time of the alleged crime
and thus not "a child of the age of sixteen years
or under" as recited in the statute denominating
the offense with which he was charged. The Su-
preme Court of Iowa sustained a writ of certiorari,
holding that a child is sixteen years of age or
under only on or before his sixteenth birthday.
Knott v. Rawlings, 96 N.W. 900 (Iowa 1959).
"Jencks" Act Governing The Production of
Statements Made To Government Agents By
Government Witnesses Is Interpreted-[n three
recent cases the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the scope and
meaning of a new statute, 18 U.S.C. §3500 (Supp.
V. 1958) governing the defendant's right to the
production of statements made to government
agents by government witnesses. The statute in
essence provides that once a government witness
has testified on direct examination in a criminal
prosecution brought by the United States, the
court upon demand of the defense shall order the
Government to produce any statement made by the
witness to a government agent. If the entire
contents of the document relate to the subject
matter of the witness's testimony it must be
delivered to the defendant for his examination and
use. If the Government claims that any part of the
statement does not relate to the subject matter of
the witness's testimony the court will order the
document to be produced for the inspection of the
court in camera. The court may excise such por-
tions of the document as are not relevant and
deliver the unexcised portion to the defendant.
Non-compliance by the Government with an
order of the court will result in the striking of the
testimony from the record or a mistrial at the
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court's discretion. A statement, for purposes of
the "Jencks" act means: "a written statement
made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him; or a stenographic,
mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a
transcription thereof, which is a substantially
verbatim recital of an oral statement made by
said witness to an agent of the government and
recorded contemporaneously with the making of
such oral statement."
A government agent's brief summary of a three
hour conference with a government witness,
consisting of only six-hundred words, does not
constitute a statement within the purview of the
statute. Palermo v. United States, 27 U.S.L. WEEK
4471, (U.S. June 22, 1959). The United States
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, upheld
the Government's refusal to produce this summary
memorandum. Tracing the legislative history of
the statute, the Court decided that the purpose of
the statute was to limit the judicial power to
compel the production of documents to a carefully
restricted class of statements with detailed proce-
dural safeguards. Motivating the Congress, it was
said, was the fear that under the Jencks case
government agents would be compelled to produce
memoianda which would reveal the inner workings
of the investigative process thereby endangering
national security. The Court further interpreted
the statute as a mandate that it was unfair to
impeach a witness with statements which were not
the witness's own words but rather "the investiga-
tor's selections, interpretations and interpolations."
Thus the Government can be compelled to produce
only those writings which satisfy the narrow
statutory definition outlined above.
In Rosenberg v. United States, 27 U.S.L. WEEK
4478, (U.S. June 22, 1959), the petitioner was con-
victed of transporting into interstate commerce a
check obtained through the perpetration of a fraud
to which he was a party. A government witness had
previously written a letter to the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, stating that she feared her
memory as to the events at issue was poor. The
trial court refused to compel the production of
the document in question and the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial
court had erred in not compelling the production
of the document but that such error was harmless
since the witness had related the contents of the
document upon cross-examination. The letter
was said to satisfy the legislative definition in that
it was in the handwriting of the witness, signed
by her and clearly related to the subject matter to
which she had testified.
The dissent concluded that the failure of the
trial court to compel the production of the letter
was not harmless error since the defense might
have been able to make better use of the letter,
than he was able to make of the witness's admis-
sion upon cross-examination.
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company v. United
States, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4464, (U.S. June 22,
1959), petitioners were convicted of conspiracy to
violate the Sherman Act. The trial judge had
refused to permit the defendant to inspect grand
jury minutes covering testimony before that body
of a key government witness at the trial. A divided
Court affirmed, holding that the petitioners had
failed to show any need for the production of the
grand jury minutes. Referring to the legislative
history of the statute, the Court concluded that
Congress intended to exclude grand jury minutes
from its operation. Thus a showing of a particular
need was thought to be required to outweigh the
long established policy of the secrecy of grand
jury proceedings.
Upon appeal the defendants contended that the
trial judge had insisted on a showing that the
prior testimony before the grand jury was incon-
sistent with the testimony at the trial and that
he had failed to examine the transcript to deter-
mine for himself whether any inconsistencies
existed. The Court ruled that the trial judge had
denied the motion not on those claimed grounds
but "on the breadth of the petition" and that no
request had been made for him to.examine the
transcript. Petitioners had mistakenly insisted
on the transcript as a matter of right rather than
showing that it was necessary to their defense.
The dissent insisted that the reasons for the
policy of secrecy did not exist in the instant case.
The defense had requested only those portions of
the grand jury minutes which contained the
witness's testimony regarding the subject matter
to which he had testified at the trial. Examination
of the transcript by the trial judge was thought to
unduly hamper the preparation of a defense for
the judge's judgement of what was relevant and
necessary to such preparation was substituted for
that of the trial counsel.
(For other recent case abstracts see pp. 382 and 429).
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